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Recent Cases

And, part three required that the
"exercise ofjurisdiction must be
reasonable."
Cybersell AZ relied on several
cases for support, but the court
found the cases unpersuasive
because the holdings were broader
than Cybersell AZ suggested. For
example, Cybersell AZ relied on an
Arizona case where the court stated
that a defendant should not "escape
traditional notions of jurisdiction"
because of modem technology.
EDIAS Software International,
L.L. C. v. BASIS InternationalLtd.,
947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996).
In EDIAS, Plaintiff claimed that
Defendant promulgated advertisements and defamatory assertions via
the Internet. Defendant had a
contract with Plaintiff, and it
solicited business in the Arizona, the
forum state. Additionally,
Defendant's employees traveled to
Arizona for business engagements
with Plaintiff. Hence, Defendant's
contact with the forum state was not
limited to Internet correspondences.
The Ninth Circuit distinguished
this case from the present one.

Unlike the defendant in EDIAS,
Cybersell FLs only contact with
Arizona was the information it
posted on its web page. As a result,
the court found EDIAS unpersuasive
for Cybersell AZ.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit
determined that Cybersell FL took
no steps to "purposefully avail"
itself of Arizona's benefits, whereas
the defendant in EDIAS did. The
court found that Cybersell FL did
not conduct any commercial activity
over the Internet in Arizona.
Cybersell FL did not form contracts
with anyone in the state. Moreover,
the court found that the company did
not actively encourage Arizona
residents to use its site, there was no
evidence that Cybersell FL pursued
business in Arizona, Cybersell FL
did not advertise in Arizona, and it
derived no any income from
Arizona.
The court also noted that Arizona
citizens had no interaction with
Cybersell FL's web page. Not one
person in Arizona "hit Cybersell FL's
web site." Cybersell FL never sent
electronic messages to people or

companies in Arizona. Moreover,
there was no evidence that any
Arizonan had enlisted Cybersell FL's
web assistance. Essentially,
Cybersell FL's presence in Arizona
was negligible.
The court concluded that posting
information on the Internet without
taking steps to purposefully avail
oneself of the laws of the forum
state did not establish personal
jurisdiction. Since the court concluded that Cybersell FL's contacts
with Arizona did not amount to
purposeful activity in the state, the
court stopped its analysis without
examining the second and third
prongs of its test. The case did not
change any preexisting laws about
personal jurisdiction simply because
this case involved an Internet.
Instead, the court demanded the
same level of minimum contacts that
it would in other cases. Accordingly,
the court concluded that Cybersell
FL did not establish the requisite
minimum contacts with Arizona, and
affirmed the lower court's dismissal.
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Medical Buyer Fails to Prove that Letter
Evidenced a Valid Requirements Contract
by Karina Zabicki
In Orchard Group, Inc. v.
Konica Medical Corp., 135 F.3d
421 (6th Cir. 1998), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court holding: (1) when a
principal allows its agent to modify
existing contracts, confirm contracts
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and conclude contract negotiations
between the principal and third
parties without further approval, the
doctrine of apparent authority will
bind the principal to the contract
formed by its agent; (2) the letter
sent by the Konica Medical Corporation agent to an Orchard Group

Incorporated agent was not a valid
contract because it neither contained
a quantity term in compliance with
the Statute of Frauds, nor met the
definition of a "requirements
contract" because nothing in the
letter indicated how a quantity term
could be implied, and (3) the letter
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did not evidence an exclusive
relationship between the two parties
which would circumvent the need
for either an implied quantity
estimate, which could be derived
from the parties' prior dealings, or a
real quantity estimate.
Orchard Group Incorporated
("OGI") commenced litigation
proceedings against Konica Medical
Corporation ("Konica") on September 3, 1992 in the United States
District Court in the Northern
District of Ohio Eastern Division,
claiming breach of contract and
fraudulent misrepresentation. On
May 27, 1994, upon the close of
discovery, Konica filed a motion for
summary judgment, which the
district court denied on January 8,
1996. The case proceeded to trial on
February 26, 1996 and culminated in
a $1,000,000 jury verdict in favor of
OGI on its breach of contract claim
and a verdict in favor of Konica on
the fraudulent misrepresentation
claim. OGI then filed a motion for
pre-judgment interest on March 12,
1996. On March 21, 1996, Konica
filed a motion for judgment as a
matter of law, which essentially
repeated all of the claims made in its
motion for summary judgment filed
in 1994. The district court denied
both the motions of OGI and Konica
on May 13, 1996 without filing a
written opinion. The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals only reviewed the
district court's denial of Konica's
motion for judgment as a matter of
law filed in March of 1996, as it was
based upon the complete trial
record.

OGI is an Ohio corporation
formed in order to act as a buying
group whose goal was to obtain
group discounts on medical supplies
for small non-hospital health care
providers. During March of 1992, an
OGI representative held discussions
with Barbara Hunter, a Konica sales
representative, regarding the
Cleveland marketplace. The negotiations centered around Konica
possibly supplying x-ray film at a
discounted price to OGI members.
On March 31, 1992, Ms. Hunter,
the agent for Konica, sent a written
proposal to an OGI representative
which set forth Konica's agreement
to offer x-ray film to OGI members
at a 40% discount. The two parties
orally agreed to the terms of the
letter and the OGI representative
asked whether OGI needed to sign
off on any document. Ms. Hunter
claimed this was unnecessary,
stating that the letter was the written
agreement. Ms. Hunter received her
boss's approval of this letter and
subsequently relayed this information to the OGI representative.
Previously, while employed by a
different company, the OGI representative had dealt with both Ms.
Hunter and her boss on similar
written proposals. These proposals
did not indicate that the OGI
representative needed approval for
the offered terms from anyone with
a higher position than Ms. Hunter
and no one at Konica had told the
OGI representative that Ms. Hunter
had limited authority; in fact,
Konica knew that Ms. Hunter was
making such proposals.

Konica Agrees To Sell X-Ray
Film To OGIAt Discounted
Prices To OGI Members

Konica Agent Sends A New
Letter To OGI Which Modi-
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fies The PreviousDeal

In early April 1992, Ms. Hunter
put the OGI representative in touch
with Robert Weaver, Konica's
Southwest Regional Manager.
Regional managers were two tiers
below the top position at Konica.
Mr. Weaver relayed to the OGI
representative that a 45% discount to
OGI customers for the x-ray film
would be more competitive. Subsequently, Mr. Weaver told Ms. Hunter
that he and the OGI representative
had negotiated a 45% discount. Ms.
Hunter delivered these new terms in
a letter dated April 13, 1992 to the
OGI representative "in return for a
film commitment of 36 months."
The OGI representative orally
accepted this new offer and Ms.
Hunter again informed the OGI
representative that the offer stood
without any need for further
approval.
A few weeks following Ms.
Hunter's April 1992 letter and with
Ms. Hunter's knowledge, OGI began
soliciting group membership for the
discounted price. During this time,
Robert Weaver, the Konica regional
manager who had initiated the 45%
discount, told a potential OGI
member of the 45% discount that
Konica had agreed to offer OGI
members. Nonetheless, three weeks
following the April 13 letter, Konica
informed OGI that there was no
deal- Konica did not enter into any
such agreements and would not
approve of this type of deal. Unable
to find another supplier, OGI was
forced to close its doors.

OGI Files Suit For Breach Of
ContractAnd Fraudulent
Misrepresentation
OGI initiated this lawsuit
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claiming that Konica breached its
contract with OGI and that Konica
had made fraudulent misrepresentations. Following the close of
discovery, Konica moved for
summary judgment on these claims.
Konica stated that the alleged
contract was invalid as it did not
comply with the Statute of Frauds
and was invalid as a requirements
contract. After this motion was
denied and the trial completed,
Konica reasserted these claims in its
motion for judgment as a matter of
law, adding the argument that the
Konica representatives that dealt
with OGI lacked the authority to
bind the corporation to the alleged
contract. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals proceeded to resolve these
issues.
Konica Is Bound By Agent's

Actions Based On Doctrine Of
ApparentAuthority
In appealing its motion for
judgement as a matter of law, OGI
used the doctrine of apparent
authority to claim that Konica's
agents bound Konica to the alleged
contract with OGI. In deciding this
issue, the Court cited Master
Consolidatedv. BancOhio Nat'l
Bank, 575 N.E.2d 817 (Ohio 1991),
to explain the doctrine of apparent
authority. Apparent authority is
determined by the actions of the
principal, not the agent. It is created
if a principle either holds out an
agent to the public as having the
authority to act or knowingly
acquiesces in the agent's acts
demonstrating authority. In addition,
the person dealing with the agent
must have a reasonable, good-faith
belief that the agent possessed the
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requisite authority to bind the
principal. When these two factors
are met, the agent binds its principal
to a contract.
The Court then proceeded to
analogize the facts of General
Electric Co. v. G Siempelkamp
GmbH& Co., 29 F3d 1095 (6th Cir.
1994), decided under the Master
Consolidatedstandard, to the facts
in the present case. In General
Electric, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a manager bound
his principal, GE, to a contract with
a manufacturer because of his
apparent authority. In that case, a
contract was evidenced by a purchase order from GE to the manufacturer. The manufacturer submitted a counter-offer, which the GE
manager accepted by signing on the
"accepted" blank. The parties had
followed this same procedure one
year prior, with the same manager
negotiating and concluding the
contract. The court ruled that by
these actions, the principal held out
the manager as possessing the
necessary authority to act as its
agent. Relating the foregoing facts
to the present case, the Court stated
that Ms. Hunter also had prior
dealings with the OGI agent and in
all of those dealings, Ms. Hunter had
orally accepted OGI's proposals,
assuring the OGI agent that no
further confirmation was necessary.
The Court cited another similarity between the facts of GE and the
facts of the present case. In both
cases, there was an absence of any
express direction from the principals
to the third parties that their agents
lacked the authority to bind them.
General Electric never expressly
informed the German manufacturer
that the manager did not have the

authority to bind it, just as Konica
never expressly informed OGI that
its agent's authority was limited.
A third analogous set of facts was
found in the contract modifications.
Just as the manager in GE continually signed contractual modifications throughout the parties'
negotiations, Ms. Hunter had
modified the originally negotiated
discount of 40% to 45% in the April
13 letter she sent- an increase
negotiated by the OGI representative
and Konica's regional manager, not
Ms. Hunter.
In holding that Ms. Hunter did
have the apparent authority to bind
Konica, the court distinguished
Dayton Bread Co. v. Montana Flour
Mills Co., 126 F.2d 257 (6th Cir.
1942), a case where the court found
that a salesman lacked the apparent
authority to bind the company. In
distinguishing Dayton from the case
at hand, the Court found that the
Dayton decision was influenced by
an Ohio law which forbade selling
commodities without an intent to
deliver the commodities in order to
speculate on price fluctuations. In
contrast, the Court reasoned that in
this case, the Konica agents were
executing valid agreements under
Ohio state law.
When the jury decided the case at
the trial court level, it did not
specify whether apparent authority
or implied authority bound Konica
to the terms of the April 13 letter.
The Court did not discuss whether
Konica's agent would have bound
Konica by implied authority, which
is found when an agent, by his words
or conduct, induces a party to
believe that the agent has the
requisite authority to bind the
principal. The Court stated that
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while the elements of apparent
authority are factual matters that a
jury determines, apparent authority
is a legal question and reasoned that
it was obvious that this case was
decided under the doctrine of
apparent authority.
OGI Fails To Convince The
Court That The April 13
Letter Was A Requirements
Contract
The breach of contract that OGI
alleged was evidenced by the April
13 letter from Ms. Hunter to the
OGI representative. The Court held
that, contrary to OGI's position, the
April 13 letter did not evidence a
valid "requirements contract"
because nothing in the letter
expressed how a quantity term could
be calculated or implied. Furthermore, the contract did not indicate
exclusivity in the dealings between
the two parties in order to circumvent the necessity for a stated or
implied estimate so as to form a
valid requirements contract.
Under the Statute of Frauds
provision in the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), codified in Ohio
as Ohio Revenue Code § 1302.04, a
contract for the sale of goods for
$500 or more is unenforceable
unless there is some writing which
evidences the contract between the
two parties. A necessary term for
enforceability is a quantity term. In
the present case, there was no
express quantity term, yet OGI
argued that the contract was nonetheless enforceable because it met
the definition of a "requirements
contract". The court determined that
the April 13 letter did not meet the
definition of a requirements contract
220 ° Loyola Consumer Law Review

under UCC 2-306(1).
A requirements contract derives
its name from the fact that one party
supplies material to another party
for as much material as necessary to
run its specific business. The Court
set forth the standard for a requirements contract, citing Cyril Bath Co.
v. Winters Industries, 892 F.2d 465,
467-68 (6th Cir. 1989):
A term which measures the
quantity by the output of the
seller or requirements of the
buyer means such actual
output or requirements as
may occur in good faith,
except that no quantity
unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or
in the absence of a stated
estimate to any normal or
otherwise comparable prior
output or requirements may
be tendered or demanded.
The April 13 letter did not meet
this definition because it lacked a
stated estimate and because there
was no prior course of dealing
between the two parties from which
to formulate an implied quantity
term. Disposing of this argument,
the Court proceeded to resolve the
final issue.
The Court rejected OGI's second
argument that the contract indicated
an exclusive agreement between
Konica and OGI, which may have
allowed the enforceability of the
requirements contract without the
necessary quantity term. A party
may forego a quantity term if it can
demonstrate that the contract is
exclusive between the two parties.
The Court cited two cases where
other circuit courts held that the
exclusive agreements at issue were
enforceable requirements contracts

even though missing the quantity
terms, but distinguished those cases
from the present case. In O.N. Jonas,
Inc. v. Badische Corp., 706 F.2d
lth Cir. 1983), exclusivity
1161 (1
was found on the basis of a memo
which summarized the history of the
parties' prior dealings and stated, "A
potential program utilizing our yam
was discussed in 1977 and we
indicated that we would supply the
yam if we were provided a Heller
guaranty on our form." Id.at 1164.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the evidence
dispelled a need for a quantity term
because both parties intended that
their agreement be a requirements
contract and cited the appellant's
good-faith need for the negotiated
product. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Advent Systems Limited
v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d
Cir. 1991), relied on O.N Jonas and
found that an exclusive contract did
not need a quantity term because
"good faith performance itself
supplies a sufficient notice of
quantity." In citing the foregoing
cases, the Court reasoned that
demanding strict compliance with
the quantity term in the Statute of
Frauds would undermine business
reality and practices because a
purchaser often does not know the
exact amount of goods he will need.
The Court found that unlike in
O.N.Jonas, the April 13 letter did
not create an exclusive relationship
because an intent to create was not
apparent from the letter. The letter
merely stated that Konica "is pleased
to offer these terms in return for a
film commitment for 36 months."
The Court found that rather than
indicating exclusivity, the letter was
actually open-ended because it
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indicated that OGI would not have to
order any units and would still be in
compliance with the terms of the
letter.
TheApril 13 Letter Was
NotA Valid Requirements
Contract

In conclusion, the Court found
that although Konica's agent bound
Konica to the terms of the April 13
letter through her apparent authority,
nonetheless, the letter was not an
enforceable requirements contract
because it did not indicate how a

quantity term could be derived and
further the letter did not evidence an
exclusive requirements contract
which would render the quantity
term unnecessary.

Third Circuit Finds TWA Insolvent
by Andrew Geier
In In re Trans WorldAirlines,
Inc. Nos. 97-7037, 97-7082, 1998
WL 15848 (3rd Cir. Jan. 20, 1998),
the Third Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court's finding that Trans
World Airlines ("TWA") was
insolvent under the formula prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A)
because the face value of its
liabilities exceeded the fair market
value of its assets. The Third Circuit
ruled that, because TWA was
insolvent on the date it deposited
$13.7 million with the clerk of the
district court, the deposit constituted
a transfer which was a voidable
preference under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
and was therefore unreachable by
TWA's creditors.
TWA Filed for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy
In October, 1991, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York awarded
Travellers International A.G.
("Travellers") $12.3 million for
damages it incurred as a result of
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TWA's breach of contract. See
TravellersInt 'lA. G. v. Robinson,
982 F2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1992). The
following November, TWA deposited $13.7 million (which represented a recalculation of the
judgment amount plus an eleven
percent interest factor) with the
clerk of the district court to obtain a
stay of enforcement of the judgment.
See In re Trans WorldAirlines, 180
B.R. 389, 392 (Bankr. D.Del. 1994).
In January, 1992, TWA filed a
timely petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11. TWA then
attempted to prevent Travellers from
making a claim to the deposit to
satisfy its judgment by filing a
complaint against Travellers in
bankruptcy court. TWA sought a
declaration that the $13.7 million
deposit was a voidable preferential
transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
and could not be reached by
Travellers in satisfaction of its
judgment. See Robinson, 982 F.2d at
97. This section, commonly known
as the "preference statute", provides
in relevant part that:
"[a] trustee may avoid any

transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property - (1) to
or for the benefit of a
creditor; (2) for or on account
of an antecedent debt owed
by the debtor before the
transfer was made; (3) made
while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made within 90 days
before the date of the filing
of the petition; (5) that
enables such creditor to
receive more than such
creditor would receive if (A) the case were a case
under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been
made; and (C) such creditor
received payment of such
debt to the extent provided by
the provisions of this title."
Travellers Makes a Claim to
TWA's Deposit
Travellers contended that TWA's
deposit did not fall within the
preference statute because not all
elements of the statute were satisfied. Specifically, Travellers argued
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